A paediatric surgeon performed Orchidectomy (removal of testicle) on a one-and-a-half-year-old boy during a procedure for undescended testis. The father-de facto complainant alleged that consent had been obtained only for Orchidopexy (repositioning of the testicle) and that Orchidectomy was subsequently inserted into the consent form by interpolation, amounting to forgery. An FIR was registered under Sections 312, 325, 426, 120-B, 406, 465, 468, 471 and 501(1) & (2) IPC; a charge-sheet was filed and the Magistrate took cognizance in C.C. No. 13 of 2008. The Madras High Court, by order dated 25.09.2023, declined to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and directed expeditious trial.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings. The Court noted that a Medical Board constituted pursuant to earlier High Court directions had opined that Orchidectomy was an appropriate and recognised alternative procedure in cases of undescended testis presenting as a nubbin of tissue, given the risk of malignant transformation. The Director of Medical and Rural Health Services had also found no fault in the consent form. Crucially, the consent form on record showed both "Orchidopexy" and "Orchidectomy" mentioned in the surgery column separated by a slash (/), and there was no forensic material — no different ink, no different handwriting — to support the allegation of interpolation.
While reiterating that questions of document tampering are ordinarily questions of fact to be decided at trial, the Court held that there is no absolute bar on the High Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to examine such questions where necessary to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. On the facts, with no malice attributed to the surgeon, no forensic evidence of interpolation, and a clear medical opinion that the procedure was appropriate, continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process. The Court distinguished Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1, noting that the dispute here was not one of medical negligence but of consent, and held that case's ratio did not apply stricto sensu.