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Supreme Court of India9 April 20262026 INSC 340

Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni

Bench of 2 · Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Prasanna B. Varale

Why it matters

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Advocates handling execution proceedings must note that a judgment debtor cannot use the executing court as a forum to re-engineer a compromise decree on grounds of practical inconvenience or self-created encumbrances (such as selling decretal land to a third party); the only permissible inquiry is as to the *identity* of the land directed to be delivered, not its substitution — making this decision directly citable to resist any application seeking modification of a decree in execution.

Summary

A Civil Appeal arising from a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, itself challenging orders passed by an Executing Court in execution of a compromise decree dated 14.07.2017 in Civil Suit No. 68 of 2012. The suit concerned 51R of non-agricultural land at plot No. 396(A), village Panchgani, Taluka Mahabaleshwar, Satara, Maharashtra. Under the compromise decree, 10R was designated common land and the remaining 41R was to be divided equally (20.5R each), with the defendant-respondent required to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant for consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs already paid.

In Execution Petition No. 21 of 2018, the Executing Court — instead of enforcing the decree as drawn — varied the portions of land allotted to each party, citing that constructions on part of the land were not as per the sanctioned map and that 10R on the extreme western side had already been sold to a third party. The defendant-respondent then filed a review petition seeking further modification, which was allowed on 26.08.2021. The plaintiff-appellant's writ petition challenging all three orders (19.07.2021, 26.08.2021, and the consequential possession order of 11.10.2021) was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on 21.04.2022.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside all three orders. The Court held that the Executing Court had plainly exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 47 CPC. Relying on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 670 and Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662, the Court reaffirmed that an executing court cannot go behind or vary the terms of a decree unless the decree is a nullity — which was not the case here. The respondent's reliance on Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. (1956) 1 SCC 75 was distinguished: that decision permits the Executing Court to resolve disputes as to the identity of land to be delivered, not to substitute different land altogether. Since the compromise decree unambiguously described the portions falling to each party, the impracticability of exchange — whether due to unauthorised constructions or a third-party sale — was held to be wholly immaterial. The Execution Court was directed to execute the decree in its terms and tenor.

Key principle

An executing court has no jurisdiction to vary or modify the terms of a decree; it must execute the decree strictly as it stands, and the impracticability of compliance — whether due to constructions not conforming to a sanctioned map or part of the decretal land having been sold to a third party — is no ground to alter the portions allotted under the decree.

Holding

Allowed — the Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 47 CPC by modifying the land portions allotted under a compromise decree; all three orders of the Executing Court were set aside and it was directed to execute the decree in its terms and tenor.

Statutes invoked

  • CPC · 47

Practice areas

civilproperty
AI-generated summary, written by Claude Sonnet 4.6 from the court's published judgment. Always verify the original before relying on the summary in court. Generated on 21 May 2026.