A landlord's legal heirs (appellants) challenged a Karnataka High Court order that had set aside a trial Court eviction decree against M/s Mahendra Watch Company (Respondent No. 1), a partnership firm. The firm held a registered lease dated 22.02.1985 in respect of a shop in Chickpet, Bengaluru, through its partner Rajesh Kumar (Respondent No. 4). The landlord initiated eviction proceedings under Sections 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, alleging that the original tenant-partner had ceased to occupy the premises and that Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 — Ashish M. Jain and Atul M. Jain — strangers to the lease, were in exclusive possession without the landlord's consent. The trial Court allowed the eviction petition; the High Court reversed it in revision under Section 46 by reappreciating the evidence.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the trial Court's eviction decree. On the first issue, the Court held that the High Court had transgressed the narrowly circumscribed limits of revisional jurisdiction under Section 46 by undertaking a fresh analysis of depositions, partnership documents, and rent receipts and substituting its own factual conclusions — an exercise indistinguishable from appellate reappreciation, which is impermissible. The Court followed the Constitution Bench ruling in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78] and reiterated that where the legislature has separately provided an appeal under Section 26, revisional jurisdiction cannot be expanded to bypass that mechanism.
On the second and third issues, the Court applied the settled two-stage burden-of-proof framework: the landlord discharges the initial onus by proving (i) exclusive possession of a third party and (ii) absence of the original tenant; thereafter the burden shifts to the tenant to rebut the presumption of unlawful sub-letting. The respondents failed to produce the original partnership deed, any duly proved retirement deed, or evidence of the landlord's written consent. The Court further held that the so-called "reconstitution" of the firm was a cloak to conceal an impermissible transfer of possession, warranting lifting of the veil of partnership. Rent receipts continuing in the name of the original tenant were held irrelevant — it is legal possession and control, not the formality of rent payment, that is determinative. The arrangement was held to constitute unlawful sub-letting/assignment under Section 27(2)(b)(ii) and also attracted Section 27(2)(p).