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Supreme Court of India9 April 20262026 INSC 336

Roma Ahuja v. The State and Another

Bench of 2 · Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice N.V. Anjaria

Why it matters

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Any defence application to quash criminal proceedings on the ground that cognizance was taken after the Section 468 CrPC limitation period is now firmly foreclosed by this reaffirmation of Sarah Mathew — courts and counsel must reckon limitation from the date the FIR was lodged or the complaint filed, not from the date of cognizance; the Court also signals that advocates who persist in arguing against settled Constitution Bench law risk judicial censure on professional ethics grounds.

Summary

Roma Ahuja lodged FIR No. 121 of 2011 at P.S. Moti Nagar, Delhi, on 09.05.2011, alleging that Respondent No. 2 — an advocate appearing for her sister — assaulted her outside a court premises, attracting offences under Sections 323 and 341 r/w Section 34 IPC. The charge-sheet was filed on 29.05.2012, approximately one year and twenty days after the incident. The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC. Respondent No. 2 moved the Delhi High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution r/w Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR, contending that cognizance was taken beyond the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 468(2)(b) CrPC. The High Court allowed the petition, holding that the date of taking cognizance — not the date of filing the FIR — was the relevant date for computing limitation, and quashed the FIR.

The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeals. Applying the Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director Dr. K.M. Cherian and Others [(2014) 2 SCC 62], the Court held that the question of whether limitation runs from the date of filing the complaint or the date of taking cognizance is no longer res integra. The relevant date is the date of filing the complaint or, equivalently, the date of initiation of criminal proceedings — here, 09.05.2011, the date the FIR was lodged — which was well within the one-year period. The Court rejected the respondent's attempt to distinguish Sarah Mathew on the ground that it involved a complaint before a Magistrate whereas the present case involved an FIR before the police, holding that the principle applies equally to both categories.

The Court also made pointed observations on professional ethics, holding that advocates have a duty to concede the applicability of binding precedent rather than advance arguments that are "worthless against binding precedent" merely to demonstrate argumentative skill. The Court reiterated that the binding effect of a Constitution Bench decision does not depend on whether every argument was canvassed before it, following Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni and Others [(2022) 13 SCC 128]. The trial court was directed to proceed expeditiously.

Key principle

For the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of initiation of criminal proceedings — whether by lodging an FIR before the police or by filing a complaint before a Magistrate — and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.

Holding

Set aside — the Delhi High Court erred in quashing the FIR on the ground that cognizance was taken beyond the one-year limitation under Section 468 CrPC, since the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew conclusively holds that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing the complaint/FIR, not the date of taking cognizance.

Statutes invoked

  • CrPC · 468
  • CrPC · 469
  • CrPC · 473
  • CrPC · 190
  • CrPC · 173
  • CrPC · 482
  • IPC · 323
  • IPC · 341
  • IPC · 34

Practice areas

criminal
AI-generated summary, written by Claude Sonnet 4.6 from the court's published judgment. Always verify the original before relying on the summary in court. Generated on 21 May 2026.