Rajkumar Yadav, selected at serial No. 336 in the unreserved category for the post of constable (driver) in the Madhya Pradesh Police, was rejected by the screening committee in June 2017 on the ground of criminal antecedents — specifically, his involvement in a 2012 FIR (Crime No. 33/2012) for offences under Sections 363, 366, 366-A, 376(2)(c) and 120B IPC (kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and rape). The trial court had acquitted him in September 2014, but expressly on the ground of benefit of doubt, recording that the charges were "not proved beyond reasonable doubt." The Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed his writ petition, upholding the screening committee's decision. The Division Bench reversed, directing the competent authority to treat the acquittal as a "clean and honourable acquittal" and reconsider his appointment within 60 days.
The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's judgment and restored the Single Judge's order. The Court held that the trial court's own language — "involvement of the remaining accused in the crime and the criminal conspiracy hatched by them is doubtful" — made plain that the acquittal was founded purely on benefit of doubt, a technical ground, and not an honourable acquittal in the sense of a definitive finding of innocence. The Division Bench had no basis to re-characterise it as honourable. The screening committee, acting on relevant considerations without any allegation of mala fides, had validly exercised its wide discretion to exclude the respondent, and the courts had no role to interpose.
The Court drew extensively on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. v. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685, Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471, Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. v. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797, Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541, and State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591, reiterating that acquittal in a criminal case is not conclusive of suitability for police service, and that even mere involvement in an offence of grave moral turpitude may be a sufficient disqualifying factor. The Court also reiterated that paragraph 53(C) of the M.P. Police Regulations was rightly applied by the Single Judge.